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ABOUT 1,500 YEARS AGO, John Philoponus,1 a Christian Neoplatonist, proposed the following 
simple argument to prove the existence of God: 
(1) Whatever comes to be has a cause of its coming to be. 
(2) The universe came to be. 
The universe has a cause of its coming to be. 
Revived interest in this argument, especially in the Kalam version championed by William Lane 
Craig,2 has met with a surprising reception. Inclined to grant the truth of premise (2) on the grounds of 
the empirical evidence of Big Bang cosmology, Quentin Smith3 has attempted to avoid the argument’s 
theistic conclusion by denying premise (1). In other words, he flatly denies the age-old dictum that ex 
nihilo nihil fit. 
Thomas Sullivan notes in a recent article that it is difficult to construct an argument in favor of the 
principle of sufficient reason (of which premise [1] is one expression) by appealing to a principle 
more obvious than the principle of sufficient reason itself.4 Sullivan is surely right about this. 
However, it is often the case that those who would dispute the truth of a fundamental axiom 
themselves hold more complex and tentative propositions to be true. A good example of this would be 
a person who, while agreeing with Smith, embraces (perhaps for good independent reasons)5 a 
metaphysics of substances. It is to just such a person that my reply is directed. 
                                                     
1
 For the battery of arguments Philoponus advances for the finitude of the past, see Philoponus: Against 
Aristotle, on the Eternity of the World, trans. Christian Wildberg (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1987). In 
this paper I do not defend premise (2) of Philoponus’s argument; for my contribution to that debate, see “The 
Finite Past,” forthcoming. 
2
 William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979); also see Craig 
and Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
3
 See for example essay 6 in Craig and Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. Also see Smith’s 
“Can Everything Come to Be Without a Cause?”, Dialogue 33:2 (Spring 1994). It should be noted that Smith is 
committed to rather more than the bare possibility of something coming to be from nothing, for he believes that 
the universe itself came to be ex nihilo yet was uncaused. 
4
 Thomas D. Sullivan, “On the Alleged Causeless Beginning of the Universe: A Reply to Quentin Smith,” 
Dialogue 33:2 (Spring 1994): 328. 
5
 For example, the ability of such a metaphysics to resolve the problem of change, to explain continuity of 
identity over time, and to provide a metaphysical ground for the natural necessities that science investigates. 
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My response is rooted in the traditional Scholastic under-standing of the principle of sufficient reason. 
To avoid some of the confusion that has grown up about this principle since the time of Leibniz, I will 
call the (weak) principle I defend simply “the reason of being.”6 The full formula for this ontological 
principle is as follows: 
Every being has the reason of being of that which belongs to it in itself or in some other: in itself, if 
that which belongs to it is a constituent of itself; in another, if that which belongs to it does so without 
being a constituent of itself.7 
In defense of this principle I will offer two types of argument. First, I will argue that denying the 
principle of the reason of being is unscientific, and leads directly to skepticism regarding our ability to 
know the world. Second, I will argue that the principle of the reason of being, while not susceptible of 
direct demon-stration, is justifiable by means of a reductio ad absurdum.8 In both types of argument 
my strategy is the same: I wish to eliminate the third disjunctive possibility which is not mentioned in 
the principle of the reason of being, namely, that being might accrue to a thing while that thing’s 
reason of being is neither in the thing itself nor in some other thing. 
I 
Denying the principle of the reason of being is unscientific on at least two counts. First, doing so flies 
in the face of our constant experience, for we directly observe the workings of efficient causality in 
the world.9 The induction from particular causal instances to the general principle of the reason of 
being has to be one of the best-confirmed hypotheses in science. What scientific principle could be 
more ubiquitous? 
                                                     
6
 In what follows it might be thought that I run together two things contemporary philosophy keeps distinct: 
“explanations” and “causes.” I plead nolo contendere. Contrary to the fashionable idiom, the Latin word causa, 
like its Greek counterpart aitia, preserves the important conceptual point that a “cause is always explanation-
affording and aitia qua explanation is always cause-specifying” (Alasdair MacIntyre, First Principles, Final 
Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues The Aquinas Lecture, 1990 (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1995), 4). When we consider the beginning of the universe, and ask for an explanation of how it came to 
be, the natural way of understanding this is as a search for the cause of the universe. For this reason, I will stick 
to the language of causation and leave the notion of explanation in the background. 
7
 R. P. Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy: An Explanation for Students (Westminster: The Newman Press, 
1962), 2:236. Aquinas’s formulation and application of the principle of the reason of being may be found in 
Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 15. 
One need not limit oneself to saying that this principle applies across all possible worlds. Possible 
world ontologies (e.g., David Lewis’s counterpart theory, the modal systems of Alvin Plantinga and Robert 
Adams) and the quantified modal logics that go with them are philosophical monstrosities: not only are the 
modal analyses offered of questionable value, they are positively harmful to the development of a healthy 
metaphysics. For inoculation against this particularly virulent strain, see the work of James F. Ross, particularly 
“The Crash of Modal Metaphysics,” Review of Metaphysics 43 (December 1989). 
8
 This warning envisages, for example, an intuitionist who might not admit reductio-style proofs, or a staunch 
defender of trivalent logic who might point out that p p. 
9
 Contra Hume (Treatise 1.3.14.), we have both external and internal impressions of causation. For an example 
of an external impression of causation, see Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Times, Beginnings and Causes,” in The 
Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 
2:148-62; see especially 150-51. As for an internal impression of causation, almost any case of conscious 
volition will do: the point of my consciously willing something (e.g., that I am going to think about the problem 
of causation) is precisely that I expect, and in fact do experience in accordance with my expectations, the 
continuous, successive responsiveness of my thoughts to the directions of my will. As DeWitt Parker remarks: 
“In the daydream, for example, we are eyewitnesses of the emergence of the dream images under the control of 
desire, and see that not only this existence but their character is such as to fulfil its intention. One wonders what 
stronger tie, what more obvious necessitation could be sought than is found here” (Experience and Substance: 
An Essay in Metaphysics [Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970], 59-60). 
3 
 
The second reason why denial of the principle of the reason of being is unscientific is that renouncing 
this principle effectively undercuts our ability to account for the regularities of Nature. A suitable 
explanation for any physical state of affairs whatsoever would be: this state arose by coming to be 
from nothing. 
To this Smith might offer the rejoinder that he is only committed to the position that "x came to be 
and x was uncaused" is the right explanation for some states of affairs. This response will not work. 
Smith could never formulate a criterion by which those states of affairs in which coming-to-be-
without-being-caused is possible can be distinguished from those states of affairs in which it is not 
possible. For, as I argue below, it makes no sense to place limits on the creative power of Nothing 
once we abandon the principle ex nihilo nihil fit. If, as Smith would have us think, the universe itself 
came to be without being caused, then surely less grand suppositions than this are feasible.10 
Let us draw out the position. Let us suppose, for the moment, that the universe came to 
be simpliciter without being caused. This means that something (i.e., the universe) came to be out of 
nothing. But, if it is really possible that something can come to be out of nothing, there is no reason 
why we should assume that this spontaneous coming to be isn’t happening all the time. How could 
any Being possibly condition Nothing in such a way that Something is produced only rarely? We 
might well ask: Why does this Nothing produce Something when that Nothing does not?11 How could 
spatial location possibly impact the fecundity of Nothing? How could time? And why should Nothing 
produce Something on a limited scale? Perhaps one might venture to say that Nothing is intrinsically 
conditioned in such a way that it is not continuously productive. But how can Nothing possess in-
trinsic limiting factors? If these intrinsic limiting factors are Something, then we have all the problems 
outlined above; and if instead they (i.e., the limiting factors) are not Something, then they are 
Nothing. Which is to say that Nothing is conditioned by Nothing. Now, this either means that Nothing 
is not intrinsically limited, but ex hypothesi we have assumed it to be, or else we have an infinite 
regress, with Nothing always being intrinsically limited by further Nothings. But all this is absurd: 
there is no intermediary between Being and Non-Being, which appears to be what is required for this 
position.12 And finally: If Nothing can be the source of Being, why then don’t we find existing things 
blipping away into Nothing? For what has the power to create should have an equal power to destroy. 
                                                     
10
 Moreover, if one believes (as Smith appears to believe) that at least one contingent being is such that 
necessarily its coming to be has a cause, then one should believe the same of all contingent beings whatsoever. 
As Sullivan argues: “For all contingent entities agree with respect to the relevant property--being a contingent 
entity. It would be entirely arbitrary to say that a contingent entity needs a cause for its emergence provided it is 
blue, but not if it is red. The relevant property is not its colour or its size but its contingency” (“On the Alleged 
Causeless Beginning of the Universe,” 330). For a fuller defense of this point, see Sullivan’s “Coming To Be 
Without a Cause,” Philosophy65:253 (July 1990): sect. 6. 
11
 This manner of speaking is somewhat tongue in cheek. Of course I do not mean to reify “Nothing.” As St. 
Anselm notes, the proper interpretation of “from nothing” (“ex nihilo”) is ‘not from anything’ (Monologium ch. 
8.) One could rephrase the above sentence as follows: Why did something come to be ex nihilo at time t0 (i.e., 
the universe’s first event-state) while there was not something coming to be ex nihilo at time t1 (i.e., last 
Tuesday)? The qualification could also be made in terms of spatial location: Why here and not there? 
Rewording the objection in either manner is legitimate since creation is simultaneous with the coming into being 
of both space and time; there really is a time t0 and a “this place here” to compare with a time t1 and “that place 
there.” 
12
 One possible way out is to claim that Nothing is really Something. In a rather curious work, Fridugisus of 
Tours takes this very route. On the authority of Scripture he asserts that the things first and foremost among 
creatures are produced out of nothing. Therefore, nothing is a great and distinguished something. It cannot be 
assessed how great is that from which so many and so distinguished things come, since not one of the things 
generated from it can be assessed for what it is worth or be defined. For who has measured the nature of the 
elements in detail? Who has grasped the being and nature of light, of angelic nature, or of the soul? Therefore, if 
we are unable to comprehend these things I mentioned, how shall we [ever] reach [the knowledge of] how great 
and what kind of thing it is from which they draw their origin and their genus? (On the Being of Nothing and 




But again, this is un-acceptable: the law of the conservation of matter/energy is fundamental to the 
physical sciences. One doesn’t, in other words, get Something for Nothing.13 
 
II 
The reductio-style proof of the principle of the reason of being has a serious methodological 
limitation in that it assumes a metaphysic of substances. Such a metaphysic I suggest on its own 
merits, and will not defend here. 
To begin, we must note that there is a real distinction between essence and existence. As Aquinas puts 
it: 
whatsoever does not belong to the concept of essence or quiddity is something accruing from 
without and effecting a composition with the essence, since no essence can be conceived 
without those things which are parts of essence. But every essence or quiddity can be 
conceived aside from the condition that something be known concerning its existence, for I 
can conceive what a man or a phoenix is and still not know if it has existence in the nature of 
things. Therefore it is clear that existence is something other than essence or quiddity, unless 
perhaps there be something the quiddity of which is its very existence.14 
The point Aquinas makes here is that whatever does not belong to the conception or understanding of 
an essence is extraneous to that essence, and forms a compound with it; this is because no essence can 
be understood without those things that are part of that essence. This is why for instance we say that 
the essence of a man includes both the form of a man--his humanity--and a physical body--that is, 
some particular lump of matter determinate in three dimensions. If we positively exclude the 
corporeal aspect of man from our understanding of his essence, we would have the notion of a purely 
intellectual substance and hence would lack an understanding of man. (The idea we would be left with 
would, however, be appropriate to an angel.) 
If an essence can be understood without some particular characteristic, it follows that that 
characteristic does not belong to the essence as such. For instance, the color of a man’s skin: I have 
experienced sunburns yet remained what I am--I am still a man and that man which I am. So, if a 
characteristic that does not belong to the essence as such is attributed to the essence, that attribution 
must be extrinsic. Now, every essence can be under-stood without anything being understood about 
its existence: this is the point of Aquinas’s man and phoenix example. I can know what a man is and 
what a phoenix is and still be ignorant as to which of the two has existence in rerum natura. 
Therefore, essence and existence are really distinct,15 unless there exists some being such that its 
essence is its very existence.16 
                                                     
13
 As Craig points out, it would be a mistake to countenance Quentin Smith’s suggestion that the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle gives us ground for supposing that something can come to be out of nothing (Craig and 
Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, 143-44 and 121-23 respectively. Smith has since retracted 
this objection: see “Can Everything Come to Be Without a Cause?”, 320.) The spontaneous arising of virtual 
particles (which possibility is admitted by the Heisenberg uncertainty relation) does not violate the principle of 
the reason of being because the quantum vacuum is very different from the void of Newton: the quantum 
vacuum is a soupy morass of energy and particles in constant flux; and virtual particles derive their existence 
from the surrounding quantum gumbo. So, whatever the full causal account of virtual particles might be, it is 
clear that their arising is not a case of something coming to be out of nothing. 
14
 St. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, c. 4 (translation in Concerning Being and Essence, trans. George G. 
Leckie [New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1937], 23-24). 
15
 Essence and existence are really distinct for all finite beings: what a thing is is really distinct from that it is. 
What, then, are we to make of the Aristotelian claim that it is essence (i.e., substantial form) which confers 
5 
 
In sum, no part of the essence can be positively excluded from our concept if we are to avoid a 
misconception of that thing we seek to understand. It would be a mistake, for instance, to exclude 
either rationality or animality from our notion of man. Similarly, if existence is really a part of the 
essence of man, it would be a misconception to exclude that characteristic from our notion of man’s 
essence. Aquinas is not saying that our notion of any essence explicitly includes all that is part of that 
essence--that would imply that we have a perfectly adequate or exhaustive knowledge of the essence 
in question--rather, he suggests that no part of the essence can be explicitly excluded from the concept 
of that essence.17 
What conclusion should we draw from this surprising fact, that a thing’s being is really distinct from 
its essence? Simply this: that being is an accident of things. Since existence belongs to things--and 
certainly a plurality of finite things do exist--and since existence is not part of the essence of things, 
then it must be said that being is present in things: While it remains extrinsic to the nature of a thing, 
being is in that thing; being is the being of some thing. But to be present in some substantial thing is 
precisely the character of an accident.18 Unlike individual substances, such as this tree and that stone, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
actuality upon a thing? The answer is that essence is that through which and in which a thing has its act of 
existing (esse), that is, “it is in and by means of the essence that the substance receives esse” (Armand Maurer, 
in his translation of Aquinas’s On Being and Essence [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949], 
28 n. 12). 
16
 Such a being would be vastly unlike all else that exists, for it would of necessity be one and simple, 
undifferentiated by any form:  
 
But, should there exist some being which is simply the act of existing, so that the act of existing be itself 
subsistent, a difference cannot be added to this act of existing. Otherwise, it would not be purely and simply the 
act of existing, but the act of existing plus a certain form. Much less can matter be added to it, because then it 
would not be a subsistent, but a material, act of existing. So we conclude that there can only be one such being 
which is its very act of existing. With this exception, in every other thing its act of existing is other than its 
quiddity, nature, or form. (De Ente et Essentia, c. 4; Maurer’s trans.) 
17
 This reasoning led Aquinas to reject Anselm’s ontological argument. From what has been said it is not 
possible to prove that God necessarily exists; rather, it is only possible for us to say that if God exists, He exists 
necessarily. 
I am much indebted to Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, 2:197-98, for the exposition given in the 
previous two paragraphs. 
18
 To understand just what an accident is, and to see how accidents are related to the other features of 
substances, it is best to quote Aristotle:  
For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be either convertible with its subject or not: and if it 
is convertible, it would be its definition or property, for if it signifies the essence, it is the definition; if 
not, it is a property [i.e., a proprium, as risibility in man]. . . . If, on the other hand, it is not predicated 
convertibly of the thing, it either is or is not one of the terms contained in the definition of the subject; 
and if it is one of those terms, then it will be the genus or the differentia, inasmuch as the definition 
consists of genus and differentiae; whereas, if it is not one of those terms, clearly it would be an 
accident, for accident was said to be what belongs to a subject without being either its definition or its 
genus or a property. (Top. 1.8 [103b8-19]) 
And: 
Again, the things signifying a substance signify of what they are predicated of just what is that thing or 
just what is a particular sort of it; but the things which do not signify a substance but are said of some 
other underlying subject which is neither just what is that thing nor just what is a particular sort of it, 
are accidental, e.g., white of the man. For the man is neither just what is white nor just what is some 
white. . . . But the things that do not signify a substance must be predicated of some underlying subject, 
and there cannot be anything white which is not white through being something different. (An. Post. 
1.22 [83a25-32]) 
Translations are from The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, vols. 1-2, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
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an accident “cannot exist separately from what it is in.”19 In the language of the Schoolmen, accidents 
are not self-subsisting. 
The accidental character of being implies dependence. An accident is a perfection of something else; 
it is incapable of separate or independent existence in its own right. We do not, for instance, find self-
subsisting orange; rather, what we find is orange in this self-subsisting, substantial cat. The order of 
dependency is clear: no cat, no orange. And the dependency of the accident of existence is likewise 
clear: all accidental being is the being of some thing. As with the color orange, being is dependent on 
the individual it actuates. Thus, being is the being of this cat, of this tree, or of this stone. 
To eliminate the note of dependency from our concept of an accident would be to make our accident 
into a substance; only substances enjoy independent existence. In the case of color, for example, we 
would be saying that orange is really separable from the orange cat. This would imply that whenever 
we talk about an orange cat, what we are really doing is talking about two different things: an orange 
and a cat. 
If we supposed that being is independent of the subject it actuates we would immediately run into 
difficulties. Insofar as being is independent, it is self-subsisting: existence would enjoy the status of a 
substance. Furthermore, whatever the relative merits of a platonic substantial Orange, there is no way 
we could concede the possibility of formally qualified self-subsisting being.20 And if self-subsisting 
being cannot admit of formal qualification, then it cannot do the job we need it to do: namely, serve as 
the actuality of a finite essence. Independent existence could never be the being of a finite thing. 
While being must retain that note of dependency proper to it as an accident, unlike all other accidental 
perfections the dependency of being is not exhausted by that particular thing in which it inheres, for 
being is metaphysically prior to what it actuates: 
With existence one has the anomaly of an accident that is, indeed, in and of its subject, but which has 
to be presupposed before one can have the subject. To have any actuality at all, the subject has to 
presuppose its own existence. In this respect the subject is dependent upon the existence, and not vice 
versa. To have any accident at all as in it and of it, the subject has to have its own actuality. Even to 
have its own existence in it and of it, the subject must presuppose its own actualization through 
existence. It cannot be viewed as first being there to receive existence and to be characterized by 
existence. . . . This means, obviously enough, that on account of its priority there is an important sense 
in which existence is not dependent upon the subject it actuates. . . . No other accident is required in 
order to give the subject the status of something in itself.21 
Consider a different accident: for example, color. A man can acquire redness of skin (i.e., become 
sunburned), and later lose that same redness, yet still remain as a man. Yet this is not parallel to the 
acquisition and loss of accidental being. A man cannot be thought of as losing the accident of 
existence and still remaining in any way whatsoever.22 Without existence, there is no subject to be 
                                                     
19
 Aristotle, Cat. 2 (1a25). 
20
 “If, then, being is not in a subject, there will remain no way in which that which is other than being can be 
united to it” (Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 52; James F. Anderson, et al., trans. [Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1975]). See n. 16 above. 
21
 Joseph Owens, An Interpretation of Existence (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985), 78-79. 
22
 This even applies to propositions like “Unicorns are fond of horseradish.” The nature “unicorn” has existence 
at least in the mind of one who judges the truth of the proposition. Though unicorn nature is not instantiated 
extra-mentally, this is not enough: completely to remove accidental existence from unicorn nature, we must 
think away the very concept “unicorn” as well. What is at stake here is not the existence of unicorns but, rather, 
the question, what has being? In the case at hand, it is our idea of unicorns that has being. We cannot exclude 
existence from our idea and yet retain that idea. (It is in the idea that unicorn nature has whatever accidental 
existence it enjoys.) While we may conceive of forgetting about unicorns (i.e., our idea of unicorns goes out of 
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conceived of as losing the accident. So, while we can conceive of a man as dying, that is, of his losing 
existence, we cannot think of that man as having a place in the world without his existing. “The 
notion of a subject losing existence negates itself, if it is understood in the same way as losing other 
perfections. The existence that is being lost is presupposed as still present in constituting the subject 
that is losing it.”23 
Now, as we have seen, accidental being cannot in any way be conceived of as independent: if 
independent, then self-subsisting; if self-subsisting, then unsuited to the actualization of finite things. 
There thus abides a surd of dependency not accounted for: insofar as being is prior to that which it 
actuates, it cannot be dependent on its immediate subject. We are forced to conclude that the being of 
any finite thing points to a further dependency upon some other thing besides its immediate subject.24 
The reasoning may be drawn out a bit further. In an important sense, we cannot locate the dependency 
of accidental being within that thing in which we find it. This dependency must either be due to some 
other (which is what the principle of the reason of being affirms), or else accidental being is 
dependent on nothing. But to depend on nothing contradicts the very nature of an accident. To depend 
on nothing is to have independent, substantial existence; and there can only be one such self-
subsisting being. Therefore, if the being found in a thing is accidental, and the thing itself came to be, 
then, necessarily, existence accrued to that thing from some other. In short, the principle of the reason 
of being holds. 
 
III 
We may now apply this result to Smith’s proposal that it is possible for something (namely, the 
universe) to come to be and yet be uncaused: To say of something that exists that it is uncaused is to 
assert that it has its reason of being within itself. But to say that something begins to exist is to say 
that it does not have its reason of being within itself, because it once was not. Now, the universe 
certainly came to be, as Smith admits. We are left with a blatant contradiction: That which exists of its 
own nature cannot not exist; that is, that which exists of itself would never not exist, it would always 
be. The universe came to be; hence its reason of being is not to be found in itself.25 Therefore the 
existence of the universe was caused. The type of cause needed to explain the coming to be of the 
universe must, of course, transcend the universe and have other interesting characteristics--but, for the 
moment, we will set aside the implications this result has for theistic apologetics.26 
                                                                                                                                                                     
existence, and with it our understanding of unicorn nature), we cannot conceive our idea of unicorns as not 
existing without actually having that very idea. 
23
 Owens, An Interpretation of Existence, 76. 
24
 This argument roughly corresponds to that used by Joseph Owens; however, Owens takes the argument to be 
a justification of creatio continuans (ibid., 108ff.). Much as I would like to agree with Owens, I am not 
convinced: even if we could prove that what exists now is dependent on another thing now, there is no guarantee 
that this dependence points us to an infinite ground of Being. Imagine a group of people standing in a circle in 
such a way that each person’s right shoulder points toward the center of the circle. Now, suppose that everybody 
squats at the same time in such a way that each person sits in the lap of the person behind himself. The people in 
the circle will not fall, even though there is nothing external to the circle that is responsible for each member’s 
accidental attribute of not falling. While this scenario is not perfectly analogous to that which I have in mind 
when arguing for an external ‘reason of being’, nonetheless it seems safest to leave open this sort of formal 
possibility. 
25
 This contradiction is a reason to avoid the locution causa sui. Self-causation is a contradiction in terms, for 
even God could not cause Himself. If He existed to cause Himself, then He would not need to cause Himself 
since He would already exist. And if He did not exist, He would not be anything such as to be able to cause 
Himself. 
26
 Here is a brief sketch of how the argument might go. First, we must note that any cause of the universe must 




I would like to thank John N. Williams and Tan Yoo Guan for their helpful comments on earlier drafts 
of this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that something which did not yet exist educed itself from pure potentiality to act. This is absurd: ex nihilo nihil 
fit. Second, we note that the coming to be of the universe is quite special, in that it involves coming to be from 
no preexisting matter. The becoming of the universe is, then, technically not a generation or a making, but rather 
creation ex nihilo. So, the universe was made to be from nothing, from absolute non-being, that is, not from any 
thing. But the gap between absolute non-being and being is infinitely vast (metaphysically speaking), and the 
only sort of power proportionate to this gap, that would be able to cross it, is an omnipotent power (cf. 
Aquinas, ScG I, c. 43). Since the universe exists, if it requires an omnipotent cause to bring about its existence, 
it follows that the transcendent cause of the universe is omnipotent. But the only way a being could be 
omnipotent would be if it were omniscient (for the only way we could say something is perfectly powerful is if 
it is knowledgeable enough to use its power perfectly; otherwise, its power would be limited, and it would not 
be an omnipotent being). So, the cause of the universe is omnipotent and omniscient. And so on. Concede any 
one of the pure perfections, and the rest quickly follow: the reasoning of Aquinas’s Summa contra Gentiles and 
Summa Theologiae moves on to its inexorable conclusion, and we arrive at the existence of a supremely perfect 
Being who is the personal creator of the universe. 
